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Cryptanalysis of public-key cryptosystems that
use subcodes of algebraic geometry codes
Alain Couvreur, Irene Ma´rquez-Corbella and Ruud Pellikaan
Abstract We give a polynomial time attack on the McEliece public key cryptosys-
tem based on subcodes of algebraic geometry (AG) codes. The proposed attack
reposes on the distinguishability of such codes from random codes using the Schur
product. Wieschebrink treated the genus zero case a few years ago but his approach
cannot be extent straightforwardly to other genera. We address this problem by in-
troducing and using a new notion, which we call the t–closure of a code.
Key words: Algebraic geometry codes, code-based cryptography, Schur products
of codes, distinguishers.
1 Introduction
After the original proposal of code based encryption scheme due to McEliece [15]
which was based on binary Goppa codes, several alternative proposals aimed at re-
ducing the key size by using codes with a higher correction capacity. Among many
others, generalised Reed–Solomon (GRS) codes are proposed in 1986 by Nieder-
reiter [17] but are subject to a key-recovery polynomial time attack discovered by
Sidelnikov and Shestakov [21] in 1992. To avoid this attack, Berger and Loidreau
[1] proposed to replace GRS codes by some random subcodes of small codimen-
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sion. This proposal has been broken by Wieschebrink [24] using Schur products of
codes.
Another proposal was to use algebraic geometry (AG) codes, concatenated AG
codes or their subfield subcodes [9]. The case of AG codes of genus 1 and 2 has been
broken by Faure and Minder [6]. Then, Marquez et. al. proved that the structure of
a curve can be recovered from the very knowledge of an AG code [12, 13] with-
out leading to an efficient attack. Finally a polynomial time attack of the scheme
based on AG codes has been obtained by the authors in [3]. This attack consists
in using the particular behaviour of AG codes with respect to the Schur product to
compute a filtration of the public key by AG subcodes, which leads to the design of
a polynomial time decoding algorithm allowing encrypted message recovery.
The genus zero case and Berger Loidreau’s proposal raises a natural question
what about using subcodes of AG codes? In this article we propose an attack of
this scheme. Compared to the genus zero case, Wieschebrink’s attack cannot extend
straightforwardly and we need to introduce and use a new notion which we call the
t–closure of a code. By this manner, we prove subcodes of AG codes to be non
secure when the subcode has a small codimension. It is worth noting that choosing
a subcode of high codimension instead of the code itself represents a huge loss in
terms of error correction capacity and hence is in general a bad choice. For this
reason, an attack on the small codimension codes is of interest.
Finally, it hardly needs to be recalled that this result does not imply the end of
code-based cryptography since Goppa codes, alternant codes and more generally
subfield subcodes of AG codes still resist to any known efficient attack. Their resis-
tance to the presented attack is discussed at the end of the article.
Due to space reasons, many proofs are omitted in this extended abstract.
2 Notation and prerequisites
2.1 Curves and algebraic geometry codes
The interested reader is referred to [22, 23] for further details on the notions in-
troduced in the present subsection. In this article, X denotes a smooth projec-
tive geometrically connected curve of genus g over a finite field Fq. We denote
by P = (P1, . . . ,Pn) an n-tuple of mutually distinct Fq-rational points of X , by DP
the divisor DP = P1 + · · ·+Pn and by E an Fq-divisor of degree m ∈ Z and support
disjoint from that of DP.
The function field of X is denoted by Fq(X ). Given an Fq-divisor E on X , the
corresponding Riemann-Roch space is denoted by L(E). The algebraic geometry
(AG) code CL(X ,P,E) of length n over Fq is the image of the evaluation map
evP :
{
L(E) −→ Fnq
f 7−→ ( f (P1), . . . , f (Pn))
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If 2g− 2 < m < n, then by Riemann-Roch Theorem, CL(X ,P,E) has dimension
m+ 1− g and minimum distance at least n−m.
When the curve is the projective line P1, the corresponding codes are the so-
called generalised Reed–Solomon (GRS) codes defined as:
GRSk(a,b) := {(b1 f (a1), . . . ,bn f (an)) | f ∈ Fq[x]<k}.
where a,b are two n–tuples in Fnq such that the entries of a are pairwise distinct and
those of b are all nonzero and k < n.
Remark 1. See [8, Example 3.3] for a description of GRS codes as AG codes.
2.2 Schur product
Given two elements a and b in Fnq, the Schur product is the component wise multipli-
cation: a∗b = (a1b1, . . . ,anbn) . Let a∈ Fnq, we set a0 := (1, . . . ,1) and by induction
we define a j+1 := a∗a j for any positive integer j. If all entries of b are nonzero, we
define b−1 := (b−11 , . . . ,b−1n ) and thus, b− j =
(
b j
)−1 for any positive integer j.
For two codes A,B ⊆ Fnq, the code A∗B is defined by
A∗B := SpanFq {a ∗b | a ∈ A and b ∈ B} .
For B = A, then A ∗A is denoted as A(2) and, we define A(t) by induction for any
positive integer t.
2.2.1 Application to Decoding, error correcting pairs and arrays
The notion of error-correcting pair (ECP) for a linear code was introduced by Pel-
likaan [18, 19] and independently by Ko¨tter [10]. Broadly speaking, given a positive
integer t, a t–ECP for a linear code C ⊆ Fnq is a pair of linear codes (A,B) in Fnq sat-
isfying A∗B ⊆ C ⊥ together with several inequalities relating t and the dimensions
and (dual) minimum distances of A,B,C. This data provides a decoding algorithm
correcting up to t errors in O(n3) operations in Fq. ECP’s provide a unifying point
of view for several classical bounded distance decoding for algebraic and AG codes.
See [14] for further details.
For an AG code, there always exists a t–ECP with t = ⌊ d∗−1−g2 ⌋, where d∗ de-
notes the Goppa designed distance (see [22, Definition 2.2.4]). Thus, ECP’s allow
to correct up to half the designed distance minus g/2. Filling this gap and correct up
to half the designed distance is possible thanks to more elaborate algorithms based
on the so-called error correcting arrays. See [5, 7] for further details.
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2.2.2 Distinguisher and Cryptanalysis
Another and more recent application of the Schur product concerns cryptanalysis of
code-based public key cryptosystems. In this context, the Schur product is a very
powerful operation which can help to distinguish some algebraic codes such as AG
codes from random ones. The point is that evaluation codes do not behave like ran-
dom codes with respect to the Schur product: the square of an AG code is very small
compared to that of a random code of the same dimension. Thanks to this observa-
tion, Wieschebrink [24] gave an efficient attack of Berger Loidreau’s proposal [1]
based on subcodes of GRS codes.
Recent attacks consist in pushing this argument forward and take advantage to
this distinguisher in order to compute a filtration of the public code by a family of
very particular subcodes. This filtration method yields an alternative attack on GRS
codes [2]. Next it leads to a key recovery attack on wild Goppa codes over quadratic
extensions in [4]. Finally in the case of AG codes, this approach lead to an attack [3]
which consists in the computation of an ECP for the public code without retrieving
the structure of the curve, the points and the divisor.
3 The attack
Our public key is a non structured generator matrix G of a subcodeC of CL(X ,P,E)⊥
of dimension l, together with the error correcting capacity t. The goal of our attack is
to recover the code CL(X ,P,E)⊥ from the knowledge of C and then use the attack
of [3] which provides a t–ECP and hence a decoding algorithm for CL(X ,P,E),
which yields a fortiori a decoding algorithm for C.
The genus zero case (i.e. the case of GRS codes) proposed in [1] was broken by
Wieschebrink [24] as follows:
• C is the public key contained in some secret GRSk(a,b).
• Compute C(2) which is, with a high probability, equal to GRSk(a,b)(2), which is
itself equal to GRS2k−1(a,b2).
• Apply Sidelnikov Shestakov attack [21] to recover a and b2, then find b.
Compared to Wieschebrink’s approach, our difficulty is that the attack [3] is not
a key-recovery attack but a blind construction of a decoding algorithm. For this
reason, even if C(2) provides probably the code CL(X ,P,E)(2), it is insufficient for
our purpose: we need to find CL(X ,P,E). This is the reason why we introduce the
notion of t–closures.
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3.1 The t-closure operation
Definition 1 (t–closure). Let C⊂Fnq be a code and t > 2 be an integer. The t-closure
of C is defined by
Ct =
{
a ∈ Fnq | a ∗C(t−1) ⊆C(t)
}
.
The code C is said to be t-closed if Ct =C.
Proposition 1. Let C ∈ Fnq, then for all t > 2,
Ct =
(
C(t−1) ∗
(
C(t)
)⊥)⊥
.
Proposition 2. Let E be a divisor satisfying deg(E)> 2g+ 1. Then:
(i) CL(X ,P,E)(t) = CL(X ,P, tE).
(ii) CL(X ,P,E)t = CL(X ,P,E) if deg(E)6 n−2t ·
Proof. (i) is proved in [3] and is a consequence of [16]. For (ii), Proposition 1 shows
that
CL(X ,P,E)
t
=
(
CL(X ,P,E)(t−1) ∗
(
CL(X ,P,E)(t)
)⊥)⊥
. (1)
Moreover, CL(X ,P, tE)⊥ =CL(X ,P,(tE)⊥) where (tE)⊥=DP− tE+K for some
canonical divisor K on X . Thus, deg
(
(tE)⊥
)
= n− deg(tE)+ 2g− 2. Since, by
assumption, deg(E) 6 n−2t we have deg
(
(tE)⊥
)
> 2g. Moreover, since degE >
2g+ 1, then, thanks to (i), Equation (1) yields
CL(X ,P,(t− 1)E)∗CL(X ,P, tE)⊥ = CL(X ,P,DP−E +K) = CL(X ,P,E)⊥.
⊓⊔
Corollary 1. Let E be a divisor and 2g+ 16 deg(E)6 n−22 . Then CL(X ,P,E)
2
=
CL(X ,P,E).
Conjecture 1. If 2g+16 deg(E)6 n−12 , let C be subcode of CL(X ,P,E) of dimen-
sion l such that and 2k+ 1− g 6 (l+12 ), where k = deg(E)+ 1− g is the dimension
of CL(X ,P,E), then the probability that C(2) is different from CL(X ,P,2E) tends
to 0 when k tends to infinity.
We give a proof along the lines of [11, Remark 5] for the special case of subcodes
of GRS codes. Our experimental results are in good agreement with this conjecture
(see Table 1). The following corollary is central to our attack.
Corollary 2. If 2g+16 deg(E)6 n−22 and 2k+1−g6
(l+1
2
) for k = deg(E)+1−
g, then the equality C2 = CL(X ,P,E) holds for random l-dimensional subcodes C
of CL(X ,P,E) with a probability tending to 0 when k tends to infinity.
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3.2 Principle of the attack
The public key consists in C ⊆ CL(X ,P,E)⊥ and t =
⌊
d∗−g−1
2
⌋
. Set l := dimC.
First, let us assume moreover that
2g+ 1 6 deg(E)6 n−12 , k = deg(E)+ 1− g and 2k− 1+ g6
(l+1
2
)
.
Step 1. With a high probability, we may assume that C(2) = CL(X ,P,2E) and
hence C2 = CL(X ,P,E) by Corollary 2. Thus, compute C
2 by solving a linear
system or by applying Proposition 1.
Step 2. Apply the polynomial time attack presented in [3] to obtain an ECP,
denoted by (A,B), for CL(X ,P,E). Which yields a decoding algorithm for C.
Estimated complexity: The computation of a closure costs O(n4) operations in
Fq and the rest of the attack is in O((log(t + g))n4) (see [3] for further details).
In case deg(E) > n−12 , then the attack can be applied to several shortenings of
C whose 2–closures are computed separately and are then summed up to provide
CL(X ,P,E). This method is described and applied in [4, 3].
This attack has been implemented with MAGMA. To this end L random subcodes
of dimension l from Hermitian codes of parameters [n,k]q were created. It turned out
that for all created subcodes a t-ECP could be reconstructed. Time represents the
average time of the attack obtained with an Intel r CoreTM 2 Duo 2.8 GHz. The
work factor w of an ISD attack is given. These work factors have been computed
thanks to Christiane Peter’s Software [20].
q n k t Time key size w l L
72 343 193 54 80 s
83 ko 230 50 1000
137 ko 243 100 1000
163 ko 262 150 1000
q n k t Time key size w l L
92 729 521 19 30 min
216 ko 232 50 500
670 ko 2121 200 500
835 ko 2178 400 500
Table 1 Running times of the attack over Hermitian codes
3.3 Which codes are subject to this attack?
Basically, the subcode C ⊆ CL(X ,P,E) should satisfy:
(i) (dimC+12 )> dimCL(X ,P,2E);
(ii) 2g+ 16 degE 6 n−22 ;
The left-hand inequality of (ii) is in general satisfied. On the other hand, as ex-
plained above, the right-hand inequality of (ii) can be relaxed by using a shortening
trick. Constraint (i) is more central since a subcode which does not satisfies it will
probably behave like a random code and it can be checked that a random code is in
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general 2–closed. Thus, computing the 2–closure of such a subcode will not provide
any significant result. On the other hand, for an AG code of dimension k, subcodes
which do not satisfy (i) have dimension smaller than
√
2k and choosing such very
small subcodes and decode them as subcodes of CL(X ,P,E) would represent a big
loss of efficiency. In addition, if these codes are too small they can be subject to
generic attacks like information set decoding.
3.3.1 Subfield subcodes still resist
Another class of subcodes which resist to this attack are the subcodes C such that
C2  CL(X ,P,E). It is rather difficult to classify such subcodes but there is a
very identifiable family: the subfield subcodes. Let F be a proper subfield of Fq
(here we assume q to be non prime) and let C := CL(X ,P,E) ∩ Fn (and then
apply a base field extension if one wants to have an Fq–subcode). The point is
that C2 ⊆ (CL(X ,P,E)(2))∩Fnq and the 2-closure of C will in general differ from
CL(X ,P,E). For this reason, subfield subcodes resist to this kind of attacks. No-
tice that even in genus zero: subfield subcodes of GRS codes still resist to filtration
attacks unless for the cases presented in [4].
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